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PROTECTING RIGHTS FROM RIGHTS:
ENUMERATION, DISPARAGEMENT, AND THE
NINTH AMENDMENT
Laurence Claus*
INTRODUCTION
Did adopting the Bill of Rights affect other legal rights that Amer-
icans possessed at the Founding and possess today? Under the laws of
the states in 1789, citizens enjoyed, for example, a right to reputa-
tion.1 Citizens also enjoyed a right to speak freely.2 The tension be-
tween those two rights was as obvious then as it is now. The laws of the
states could have resolved that tension entirely in favor of one right or
the other; instead, those laws provided some protection for each right.
Freedom of speech was protected at common law by courts' refusal to
impose prior restraints on publication.3 Reputation was protected at
common law through ex post remedies for defamation. 4 That was the
balance that state common, statutory, and constitutional law struck be-
tween the competing legal rights to speech and to reputation. 5 Did
adopting the Bill of Rights change that balance?
* Associate Professor of Law, University of San Diego. The thesis of this Article
was triggered by a conversation I had with my former co-clerk, Nicholas Quinn
Rosenkranz, about the problem of tension between legal rights. I am grateful for his
comments on successive drafts, and for comments from Morgan Skye Adessa, Larry
Alexander, Carl Auerbach, Larry Kramer, Dylan Malagrino, Saikrishna Prakash,
Michael Ramsey, Michael Rappaport, Steven Smith, and Christopher Wonnell. I am
also grateful for excellent research assistance from Morgan Skye Adessa, Alex
Papaefthimiou, and Melanie Moultry, and for a summer research grant from the
University of San Diego School of Law.
1 See, e.g., Respublica v. Oswald, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 319, 324-25 (Penn. 1788); 1
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *134.
2 See, e.g., Respublica, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) at 325.
3 See, e.g., id.; Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olsen, 283 U.S. 697, 713-14 (1931); 4
BLACKSTONE, supra note 1, at *151-52.
4 See, e.g., Near, 283 U.S. at 713-14 (1931); Respublica, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) at 325; 4
BLACKSTONE, supra note 1, at *151-52.
5 See infra Part IV.
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The Bill of Rights called the freedom of speech a federal constitu-
tional right, but the Bill of Rights did not mention the right to reputa-
tion. Did enumeration in the Constitution of the freedom of speech
imply that protection for speech should be expanded at the expense
of the right to reputation? In other words, did "[t] he enumeration in
the Constitution of certain rights," including the freedom of speech,
diminish the protection afforded "others retained by the people," in-
cluding the right to reputation?6 The Supreme Court in New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan said "yes."'7 The Ninth Amendment seems to say
"no." "The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights shall not
be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people."
Though the Court in New York Times v. Sullivan ignored the Ninth
Amendment, my thesis in this Article is that the Ninth Amendment
holds the key to that case, and to countless other cases of tension be-
tween rights.
Was tension between rights the particular problem that was on the
Founders' minds when they proposed and adopted the Ninth Amend-
ment? No. Is tension between rights an instance of the general prob-
lem that was on the Founders' minds when they proposed and
adopted the Ninth Amendment? Yes. The Founders' general con-
cern was that listing federal constitutional rights might negatively af-
fect the status of other rights. The Founders were particularly
concerned that listing federal constitutional rights might imply that
the federal government had broader powers than the Constitution
was meant to confer.9 But the Founders chose to frame the Ninth
Amendment as a general declaration that listing federal constitutional
rights should not negatively affect the status of other existing rights.
Given the nature of the Founders' particular concern about over-
reaching exercises of federal legislative power, there is every reason to
find the Ninth Amendment justiciable:' ° When, in the wake of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the leading provisions of the Bill of Rights
were held to limit state law,11 the problem of tension between rights
6 See U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
7 376 U.S. 254, 283 (1964).
8 U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
9 See infra Part III.
10 See, e.g., 3 DEBATES IN THE SEVrERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 553 (Jonathan Elliot ed., New York, Burt Franklin 1888)
[hereinafter ELLIOT'S DEBATES] (statement of John Marshall, Virginia Ratification
Convention).
11 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the juris-
diction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
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emerged as a significant scenario to which the Ninth Amendment
speaks. Until the Fourteenth Amendment, tension between constitu-
tional rights and "others retained by the people" could arise only to
the extent that federal common law (or perhaps federal statutes) pro-
tected other rights "retained by the people," or to the very limited
extent that the original Constitution created constitutional rights
against the states. 12 Since the Fourteenth Amendment, the problem
of competing rights has become much more apparent.' 3 The Foun-
ders quite understandably did not have the problem of tension be-
tween rights specifically in mind when they proposed and adopted the
Ninth Amendment. But the problem falls within the compass of their
general concern.
The Ninth Amendment concerns the status that other rights "re-
tained by the people" would have enjoyed in the absence of the Bill of
Rights. It is not a command to treat other rights "retained by the
people" as if they were in the Bill of Rights. The Ninth Amendment
does not turn other rights "retained by the people" into "federal con-
stitutional" rights.'4 It just requires that those other rights not be di-
minished in status by adoption of the Bill of Rights. The right to
reputation is not relevantly denied or disparaged unless listing certain
rights in the Constitution is construed to leave reputation less pro-
tected than it would otherwise have been. If other rights "retained by the
people," such as reputation, were not federal constitutional rights
when the Ninth Amendment was proposed in 1789, then they were
not federal constitutional rights when the Ninth Amendment took ef-
fect in 1791.
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.
See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 147-48 (1968); Adamson v. California, 332
U.S. 46, 51 (1947); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 323-25 (1937); AKHIL REED
AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 218-23 (1998).
12 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
13 See infra Part III.C.
14 I use the term "federal constitutional" rights to connote rights that courts rec-
ognize to trump legislation when those courts are adjudicating under the authority of
the Constitution. Courts may conceive of some legislation-trumping rights as having
their ultimate source in the natural moral order, but where those courts' authority to
adjudicate derives from positive legal text, they have almost invariably couched at-
tempts to enforce "natural" rights in terms of textual implication, adopting at least an
"illustrative" conception of the authoritative text. See Laurence Claus, Implication and
the Concept of a Constitution, 69 AUST. L.J. 887 passim (1995).
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Under this interpretation, the Ninthi Amendment makes a sub-
stantial contribution to the constitutional scheme, but one fully con-
sistent with the Founders' choice to constitutionalize particular
individual rights through "enumeration." Leading rival interpreta-
tions do too little or too much. Some say that the Ninth Amendment
is a dead letter. Others argue that it is a blank check. 15 Either way,
the amendment unsatisfactorily serves the purposes of law. We do not
like law to mean nothing, nor do we like it to mean everything. We
assume that lawgivers share our dislike of these two possibilities, be-
cause both possibilities demean the project of lawgiving. They com-
promise our claim to have "a government of laws and not of men."' 6
I. RIVAL INTERPRETATIONS
A. "Dead Letter" Interpretations
1. Confirming the Enumeration of Powers
Dissenting in Griswold v. Connecticut, Justice Hugo Black con-
tended that the Ninth Amendment
was passed, not to broaden the powers of this Court or any other
department of "the General Government," but, as every student of
history knows, to assure the people that the Constitution in all its
provisions was intended to limit the Federal Government to the
powers granted expressly or by necessary implication. 17
The Constitution drafted at Philadelphia in 1787 purported to
limit the federal Congress's legislative power. It did so by listing the
subjects to which federal legislative power extended. This listing is
commonly called an enumeration, though the list in Article I, Section
8 is not explicitly numbered. During the ratification debates, propo-
nents of the Constitution argued that federal power was sufficiently
limited by the enumeration of powers, and that adding a bill of rights
would actually expand federal power.' 8 How would it do that? By im-
plying that federal legislative power extended to everything except the
specifically constitutionalized rights. In other words, adding a bill of
rights would invert the Constitution's power-limiting principle from
15 I am grateful to Steven Smith for the "dead letter/blank check" characteriza-
tion of existing interpretations.
16 MAss. CONST. pt. I, art. XXX (1780); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)
137, 163 (1803).
17 381 U.S. 479, 520 (1965) (Black & Stewart, JJ., dissenting); see also Thomas B.
McAffee, The Original Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1215, 1219
(1990).
18 See infra Part III.
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one of listed powers to one of listed rights. But this objection to a bill
of rights could be met simply by saying that the bill did not under-
mine the limitations to which federal power was already subject. The
Founders said that in the Tenth Amendment.' 9 Perhaps, as Justice
Black suggested, the Ninth Amendment made the same point; but if
that was all it did, then it was redundant.
2. Acknowledging State Law
Other scholars have argued that the Ninth Amendment just ac-
knowledges that individual rights under state law are operative unless
and until courts hold that those rights are unconstitutional or have
been preempted by federal law. 20 These scholars do not recognize a
role for the amendment in determining whether state law rights are
unconstitutional. On their view, the Ninth Amendment simply notes
that the rights listed in the federal Constitution do not exhaust the
universe of rights possessed within American society. In John Hart
Ely's words:
We thus run up against an inference that seems so silly it would not
have needed rebutting. What felt need could there have been to
rebut the inference that the Bill of Rights, controlling only federal
action, had somehow preempted the efforts of the people of the
various states to control the actions of their state governments?
21
As Ely adds, such an inference concerning nonconstitutional
state law rights would have been even more improbable. 22 "Acknowl-
edgement" interpretations make the Ninth Amendment a truism.
B. "Blank Check" Interpretations
These interpretations share an understanding "that the Ninth
Amendment was intended to signal the existence of federal constitu-
tional rights beyond those specifically enumerated in the Constitu-
19 U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively,
or to the people.").
20 See Russell L. Caplan, The History and Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, 69 VA. L.
REV. 223, 243 (1983); see also Michael W. McConnell, A Moral Realist Defense of Constitu-
tional Democracy, in 2 THE RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE: THE HISTORY AND MEANING
OF THE NINTH AMENDMENT 71, 77 (Randy E. Barnett ed., 1993) [hereinafter RIGHTS
RETAINED] (including rights created under nonconstitutional federal law and rights
derived from nongovernmental sources).
21 JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUsT 37 (1980).
22 Id. at 37 n.*.
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tion."2 3 This conclusion, to the extent that it acknowledges justiciable
federal constitutional rights, presupposes two propositions. First, the
Founders thought that courts, confronted with the 1787 Constitution,
would likely have superimposed some set of "federal constitutional"
rights upon its structure even if the Constitution had listed none. Sec-
ond, the Founders wanted courts to recognize as federal constitu-
tional rights some set of rights that had been omitted from the
Constitution's list. These two propositions are not supported by James
Madison's explanation to Congress of his draft Bill of Rights. In that
speech, Madison emphasized that judicial enforcement would follow
from having "rights expressly stipulated for in the constitution."2 4 No-
where in his speech did Madison recognize a possibility that courts
would constitutionalize rights anyway, or could be empowered to do
so with a one-sentence delegation of authority. And that speech is our
most compelling evidence of what the Founders sought to accomplish
through the Ninth Amendment.25
"Blank check" interpretations of the Ninth Amendment depend
on the proposition that rights like those expressed in the Bill of Rights
would likely have been enforced by courts as federal constitutional rights
even if the Bill of Rights had not been adopted. That proposition is
necessary to the "blank check" conclusion that "deny or disparage"
means "fail to accord federal constitutional status." On this under-
standing, at least some of the rights expressed in the Bill of Rights
were, ex ante, part of a set of extra-textual "federal constitutional"
rights. By acknowledging in text that some of the set had federal con-
stitutional status, so this theory goes, the Founders risked denying or
disparaging the federal constitutional status of the other rights in the
set. The Founders obviated that risk by adopting the Ninth
Amendment.
This understanding of the Ninth Amendment is difficult to rec-
oncile with Madison's explanation of what the Bill of Rights was
meant to achieve. Madison fully appreciated the potential for judicial
enforcement of federal constitutional rights, but seemed to tie that
potential to federal constitutional enumeration.26 Madison implied
that enumeration elevated the legal status of rights, not that enumera-
tion merely acknowledged some pre-existing condition. But if explicit
23 Id. at 38; see also, e.g., CALVIN R. MASSEY, SILENT RIGHTS 217 (1995); Charles L.
Black, On Reading and Using the Ninth Amendment, in 1 RIGHTS RETAINED, supra note
20, at 337, 337; Thomas C. Grey, The Uses of an Unwritten Constitution, 64 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 211, 220 (1988).
24 1 CONG. REG. 434 (1789); 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 439 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789).
25 See infra Part III.B.
26 1 CONG. REG. 433-34 (1789); 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 439 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789).
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inclusion in the Constitution's text elevated rights, then what did deny-
ing or disparaging other rights mean? Denying or disparaging had to
mean something more negative than treating other rights differently
from the elevated rights. To be denied or disparaged is to be made
worse off than before, not merely to miss out on being made better
off.
The Ninth Amendment is not a declaration that rights "retained
by the people" are as important as federal constitutional rights. The
Ninth Amendment is a declaration that rights "retained by the peo-
ple" are no less important than they would have been had no rights
been enumerated. To return to the example with which I began,
rights to freedom of speech and to reputation were each recognized
and protected under the laws of the states in 1789.27 One of those
rights-the freedom of speech-was elevated by express inclusion in
the federal Constitution. The other-the right to reputation-was
not. The right to reputation was not denied or disparaged by missing
out on elevation to a status it had never had. The right to reputation
might have been denied or disparaged if it had suffered a loss or dimi-
nution of status. How might the enumeration in the Constitution of
the freedom of speech have diminished the status of the right to repu-
tation? By encouraging courts to construe the freedom of speech
more broadly than before, at the expense of the right to reputation.
And that is a scenario to which the Ninth Amendment plausibly
speaks.
II. PROTECTING RIGHTS FROM RIGHTS
As I shall recount in Part II.A, the Founders' attention was fo-
cused on one particular negative effect that constitutionalizing some
rights might have upon other rights. That effect was an inference that
federal power extended to everything but the constitutionalized
rights. The ratification debates repeatedly record concern that a bill
of rights would undermine the constitutional enumeration of powers.
The concern most frequently expressed was that the enumeration of
powers would be ignored. In the Tenth Amendment, the Founders
fully addressed that particular concern. 2 8 Yet they chose, in the Ninth
27 Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olsen, 283 U.S. 697, 713-14 (1931); Respublica v.
Oswald, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 319, 325 (Penn. 1788); 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 1, at *134.
28 The Tenth Amendment drew on the final clause of the eighth resolution that
Madison proposed to the First Congress. See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 436 (Joseph Gales
ed., 1789) ("The powers not delegated by this constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
States, are reserved to the States respectively."). The adopted Tenth Amendment in-
cluded the additional words "or to the people," and obviated any risk that the Bill of
Rights would imply federal powers beyond those delegated.
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Amendment, to provide more generally that constitutionalizing some
rights should not have negative effects upon other rights.
The Founders did not purport to detail the range of other nega-
tive effects there might be, any more than they traversed the range of
expression that might warrant protection under the First Amendment
or the range of punishments that might stand condemned by the
Eighth Amendment. They left to those who came after the task of
noticing negative effects, and of finding in the Ninth Amendment a
warrant to resist those effects. One such negative effect was an infer-
ence that federal powers should be read broadly enough to reach the
constitutionally enumerated rights, thus sweeping up many nonconsti-
tutional rights en route.29 Had that been the only other negative ef-
fect that the Founders could have conceived and cared to guard
against, they would surely have precluded it specifically. The Foun-
ders chose to provide more generally that constitutionally enumerat-
ing some rights should not have negative effects upon other rights.
A. Preliminary Interpretive Questions
The Ninth Amendment protects rights from rights. How does it
do so? The text of the amendment is susceptible of more than one
interpretation: "The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the
people. ' 30 When we parse this text, a series of multi-pronged inter-
pretive possibilities appear.
1. "Rights"
What are rights within the phrase "others retained by the people"?
The preceding eight amendments list vertical rights against govern-
ment. They are rights, mainly individual, but some arguably collec-
tive, to be free from government action. Tension between vertical
rights (or the vertical aspects of rights) is certainly possible-consider
the tension between the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of
the First Amendment. But tension is far more frequent between verti-
cal rights on the one hand, and horizontal rights (to be free from
actions by other persons) on the other. "[O]thers retained by the
people" is plausibly understood to include legal rights against other
persons, not just legal rights against government. In other words,
rights retained by the people include rights to government protection
from other persons, not just rights to government protection from
29 See infra Part V.A.
30 See U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
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government. Blackstone's conceptualization of fundamental rights
certainly embraced both.31
2. "Retained by the People"
Does the concept of retention by the people refer to how rights
are retained or only to whose rights are retained? The phrase echoes a
proposition regularly recited during the debates over ratification of
the Constitution: "That which is not expressly granted, is of course
retained."32 At the North Carolina Ratification Convention, one dele-
gate opined: "We retain all those rights which we have not given away
to the general government.' 33 The people retained those individual
and collective rights that they had not surrendered through the Con-
stitution's delegation of powers to the federal government. But does
"retained by the people" refer not only to who holds the rights
(namely, the people) but also to how those rights are held? If so, then
the rights at issue are rights recognized and protected by the people
in their law. It would follow from this interpretation that the rights
"retained by the people" do not include mere moral (or "natural law")
claims that positive law does not respect. On the other hand, if "re-
tained by the people" refers only to whose rights are retained, then the
phrase could cover moral claims that have escaped translation into
positive law.
3. "The People"
Who are "the people" within the phrase "others retained by the
people"? The people may be viewed through a national lens, or
within their states. If the people are viewed nationally, then the rights
retained by the people are a set of rights that are shared by the people
of the several states. Some states may have recognized more rights
than have other states, or may have protected rights more elaborately
than have other states. On a "national" view of "the people," only tht
protections for rights that are common among the states would count
as "others retained by the people." Another view would include in the
set of "others retained by the people" the greatest protections for the
least commonly recognized rights to be found anywhere among the
states. A third view would vary the rights "retained by the people"
from state to state, so that when a particular state's actions are chal-
31 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 1, at *125.
32 See John DeWitt, To the Free Citizens of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, in 4
THE COMPLETE ANTIFEDERALIST 21 (HerbertJ. Storing ed., 1981).
33 2 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 938
(1971) (statement of Archibald Maclaine, July 25, 1788).
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lenged as violating federal constitutional rights, the rights "retained
by the people" are ascertained by reference to that state's actions
alone.
4. "Others Retained by the People"
Are "others retained by the people" limited to rights that law has
explicitly fashioned as such-that is, rights for which the law affords
persons a vindicating cause of action and remedy? I will call this the
narrow conception of rights. Broader conceptions of "others retained
by the people" are possible, even so far as those rights are understood
to be rights under positive law. "Governmental interests" or "public
interests" that courts find legitimate can always be recharacterized as
human interests. When a law fosters and protects those interests, it
can be characterized as fashioning legal rights, even though courts do
not always recognize it to have done so for purposes of standing to
sue. A law that prohibits misleading advertising, for example, may be
characterized as creating a legal right not to be misled. Clearly that
right is in tension with a constitutional right to freedom of speech.
Under the Supreme Court's jurisprudence, that tension is resolved en-
tirely in favor of the nonconstitutional legal right not to be misled.
Laws that prohibit objectively misleading advertising are valid, not-
withstanding the First Amendment.3 4
Some might argue that whichever conception of rights is ac-
cepted, to be "others retained by the people" within the meaning of
the Ninth Amendment, those rights must also fit within a coherent
theory of natural law.3 5
5. Mechanisms of Retention
If the narrow conception of rights is adopted, then rights may be
retained by the people only through their state constitutions, through
legislation adopted by their representatives, or through their acquies-
cence in the common law. If the broad conception of rights-as-inter-
34 See, e.g., Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 367 (2002).
35 See MAssEY, supra note 23, at 175-76; Edward S. Corwin, The "Higher Law" Back-
ground of American Constitutional Law, 42 HARV. L. REV. 149, 152 (1928); Thomas C.
Grey, Do We have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REv. 703, 715-16 (1975);
Thomas C. Grey, Origins of the Unwritten Constitution: Fundamental Law in American Rev-
olutionary Thought, 30 STAN. L. REV. 843, 844 n.8 (1978); Suzanna Sherry, The Founders'
Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 1127, 1166-67 (1987); cf Walter Berns, Judi-
cial Review and the Rights and Laws of Nature, 1982 Sup. CT. RV. 49, 77; Philip A.
Hamburger, Natural Rights, Natural Law, and American Constitutions, 102 YALE L.J. 907,
907-08 (1993).
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ests is adopted, then rights may also be retained through executive
action.
6. When are Rights Retained?
The amendment's use of the past tense nudges in favor of finding
rights to have been "retained" only if they were protected by state law
(or possessed naturally) in 1789. On this view, the people may choose
to cease retaining in positive law the rights they had in 1789, but can-
not expand the set of retained rights. An alternative view is that "re-
tained" means "retained from time to time." While the primary
meaning of "retain" is to keep what one already has, the word may
also refer to employing something new.36 If the latter view is taken,
then the people may expand the set of retained rights, and may do so
through their federal government as well as through their states.
7. Denial or Disparagement
What counts as denying or disparaging? Does any diminution of
the protection accorded to a retained right deny or disparage that
right? If so, then the retained rights operate as brittle limits on the
construction of federal constitutional rights. An alternative under-
standing is that rights are denied or disparaged when they do not re-
ceive due weight within an optimal array of individual rights.
Optimality may be determined by, among other things, balancing the
interests underlying retained rights against the interests underlying
federal constitutional rights.
Now we are ready to consider how the Ninth Amendment pro-
tects rights from rights. There are at least two arguable understand-
ings of how the amendment fulfils this function. I shall call them the
hard and soft versions.
B. The Hard Version
The hard version adopts the first answer to each of the last seven
interpretive questions. Within this conception, the Ninth Amend-
ment protects the explicit rights that people enjoyed under the laws of
all the states in 1789. Federal constitutional rights must be construed,
if possible, not to reduce the protection that state law explicitly ac-
cords other rights, in so far as state law protects those other rights no
further than it did in 1789. The rights retained by the people are the
36 1 SAMUEL JOHNSON, DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (London, W.
Strahan 1755) ("To keep; not to lose ... To keep in pay; to hire... To belong to; to
depend on.").
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legal rights that were cherished in the America of 1789. These might
be found in the common law, in state statutes, or in constitutions and
charters. They are the rights that were "secured within the customary
constitutional tradition. '37 They were "constitutional" in the sense of
"constitutive of the political order." Returning to our example, state
law in 1789 recognized and protected both a right to reputation and a
right to freedom of speech.3 8 Under the hard version, the Ninth
Amendment requires that the federal constitutional freedom of
speech be construed not to reduce the protection that state law ac-
cords the right to reputation below the level of protection accorded in
1789. Whatever accommodation state law made between the freedom
of speech and the right to reputation in 1789 is, on this view, effec-
tively preserved. Retained rights are defeasible at the option of state
lawmakers, but may not be shriveled through federal constitutional
interpretation. The breadth of federal constitutional rights is con-
fined accordingly.
In identifying a shared set of rights retained by the people of the
several states in 1789, a court might consult William Blackstone's ac-
count of fundamental rights under English law. His Commentaries ac-
quired a large and deferential audience in the American colonies:
"Edmund Burke, speaking on reconciliation with America in the
House of Commons in 1775, told that body that almost as many copies
of the Commentaries had been sold in America as in England."3 9 Ar-
thur Sutherland recounts that "[1]awyers cited Blackstone in Ameri-
can courts as today they cite opinions of their state's highest court."40
The set of explicit rights so identified is likely to be modest, and their
operation as brittle limits on the construction of federal constitutional
rights would be correspondingly modest. Moreover, they are necessa-
rily subject to explicit constitutional preclusion. They operate as lim-
its on federal constitutional rights only where those constitutional
rights are susceptible of a construction that admits of those limits.
37 Larry D. Kramer, Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARv. L. REv. 4, 39 (2001).
38 See infra Part IV.
39 ARTHUR E. SUTHERLAND, THE LAW AT HARVARD 25 (1967). YoungJames Iredell
wrote to this father in London, in July 1771, asking him to
be so obliging as to procure Dr. Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of
England for me and send them by the first opportunity? I have indeed read
them through by the favor of Mr. Johnston who lent them to me; but it is
proper I should read them frequently and with great attention.
Id. at 24.
40 Id. at 24.
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C. The Soft Version
The soft version conceives of the Ninth Amendment as authoriz-
ing the adjudicative balancing task in which courts have always en-
gaged when applying the Bill of Rights. The soft version allows for,
though it does not require, a more expansive and evolving conception
of the rights retained by the people. They may be understood as the
interests that the people recognize and foster and protect through the
laws that their representatives enact, their courts expound, and their
executives implement. The task of adjudicating by reference to the
Bill of Rights involves asking whether a given law or executive action
conflicts with a federal constitutional right. Where that law or action
implements a public interest, it may be understood to recognize and
serve a right "retained by the people"-such rights are the interests
that the community recognizes and protects through its laws. The
Ninth Amendment, on this view, calls for reconciling tension between
federal constitutional rights and whatever other legal "rights" are "re-
tained by the people" from time to time. Consider what the Supreme
Court asked last term when examining a law that prohibited advertise-
ments for certain drugs:
Under the test we ask as a threshold matter whether the commercial
speech concerns unlawful activity or is misleading. If so, then the
speech is not protected by the First Amendment. If the speech con-
cerns lawful activity and is not misleading, however, we next ask
"whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial." If it is,
then we "determine whether the regulation directly advances the
governmental interest asserted," and, finally, "whether it is not more
extensive than is necessary to serve that interest." Each of these lat-
ter three inquiries must be answered in the affirmative for the regu-
lation to be found constitutional. 4 1
As already noted, "governmental interests" or "public interests"
that courts find legitimate can always be recharacterized as human
interests. When a law fosters and protects those interests, it can be
characterized as fashioning legal rights, even though courts do not
always recognize it to have done so for purposes of standing to sue.
When the Tenth Amendment speaks of powers being reserved to
the states or to the people, it means the people collectively, exercising
their collective power to create law. When the Ninth Amendment
speaks of rights retained by the people, it may coordinately be under-
stood to mean the people collectively, recognizing and upholding cer-
tain interests through the laws they collectively create or implement.
It is the people who confer the power to legislate or act in ways that
41 Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 367 (2002) (citation omitted).
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may negatively affect rights. It is they who may through the laws they
make positively foster rights. That positive fostering is not to be de-
nied or disparaged by their choice to give certain rights law-trumping
weight through federal constitutionalization. If a law is in tension
with a federal constitutional right, the constitutional right should be
interpreted with due regard to the interest served by that law. That
interest should not be treated as nonexistent (denied), nor given less
weight than it deserves (disparaged).
Courts acknowledge the 'Just importance"42 of other interests by
weighing that importance when deciding the scope of federal consti-
tutional rights. The post-New Deal Supreme Court often character-
ized this task as applying a rebuttable "presumption of
constitutionality." 43 Consider the Court's recent encounter with ten-
sion between a religious canvasser's First Amendment right to express
the tenets of her religious faith and a householder's nonconstitutional
right under municipal law not to be bothered at home.44 As the first
right enjoys federal constitutional protection and the second does
not,45 are laws that foster the second right invalid as applied to any
circumstance in which they appear to limit the first, constitutional
right? Not necessarily. The Court weighed the interests underlying
the federal constitutional right to speech against those underlying the
law at issue in the case.
The Village argues that three interests are served by its ordinance:
the prevention of fraud, the prevention of crime, and the protec-
tion of residents' privacy. We have no difficulty concluding, in light
of our precedent, that these are important interests that the Village
may seek to safeguard through some form of regulation of solicita-
tion activity. 4 6
42 1 CONG. REG. 428 (1789); 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 435 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789)
(speech of James Madison).
43 The phrase was first used in the Supreme Court in In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436,
442 (1890), but its regular invocation followed Justice Brandeis's reference in
O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 282 U.S. 251, 256 n.1 (1931). See United
States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 (1938); W. Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300
U.S. 379, 397 (1937); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 83 (1936) (Stone, J.,
dissenting).
44 Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150,
165, 168 (2002).
45 Id. at 168-69. The Court did not treat the municipal law as creating a property
right protected by the Takings and Due Process Clauses. Had it done so, its tension-
resolving analysis would likely have been little different. The soft version of the Ninth
Amendment reminds courts that such analysis is required even when only one of the
rights in tension has federal constitutional status.
46 Id. at 164-65.
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The Court struck down the ordinance, but "central" to its conclu-
sion of unconstitutionality was a finding that the measure was "not
tailored to the Village's stated interests."47 Dissenting, Chief Justice
Rehnquist quoted from an earlier decision: "Great as is the value of
exposing citizens to novel views, home is one place where a man
ought to be able to shut himself up in his own ideas if he desires. '" 48
Disagreement between the ChiefJustice and his Court concerned how
to construe the federal constitutional right to freedom of speech in
light of the retained but nonconstitutional right to quiet enjoyment of
private property. But there was no disagreement that the retained
right was relevant to the Court's enquiry. The obvious relevance of a
federal constitutional right to the facts did not necessarily mean that
the party invoking it would prevail. Indeed, under the hard version of
the Ninth Amendment, the party invoking the federal constitutional
right in Stratton would likely have failed. In his account of late eight-
eenth century common law, Blackstone wrote:
So great moreover is the regard of the law for private property, that
it will not authorize the least violation of it; no, not even for the
general good of the whole community .... Besides, the public good
is in nothing more essentially interested, than in the protection of
every individual's private rights, as modelled [sic] by the municipal
law.49
The soft version of the Ninth Amendment constitutionalizes a
rule that federal constitutional rights are not to be construed to ride
roughshod over other legal rights in the event of tension. Courts are
charged with resolving the conflict without assuming that the federal
constitutional status of one of the rights means that the other must
inevitably give way. And this, of course, is precisely what courts do.
47 Id. at 168. That analysis comports with the Tenth Circuit's recent stay of a
district court injunction that had prevented the Federal Trade Commission's (FTC)
implementation of its national "do-not-call" registry. Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Main-
stream Mktg. Servs., Inc., 345 F.3d 850, 860-61 (10th Cir. 2003). The district court
had ruled that the FTC's regulatory regime infringed telemarketers' First Amend-
ment speech rights. Mainstream Mktg. Servs., Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 283 F.
Supp. 2d 1151, 1160-68 (D. Colo. 2003). In staying the district court's injunction, the
Tenth Circuit panel held that the Federal Trade Commission had shown a substantial
likelihood of success on the merits. Mainstream Mktg. Servs., 345 F.3d at 853-60. The
constitutional right to speech was unlikely to be construed so broadly as to displace
the privacy right that Congress had sought to protect. See H.R. 3161, 108th Cong.
(2003).
48 Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y, 536 U.S. at 176 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting)
(quoting Hynes v. Mayor & Council of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 619 (1976) (citing Z.
CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 406 (1954))).
49 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 1, at *139.
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The point of the Ninth Amendment is not that governments cannot
curtail other rights retained by the people, but that governments are
authorized to continue providing for those other rights, should they
wish to do so, even when those other rights are in tension with federal
constitutional rights. When the freedom of speech runs up against
the law of trespass, speech need not be construed to prevail. When
the right to bear arms runs into the law of nuisance, gun-toting need
not be construed to prevail. Thus the Ninth Amendment provides a
textual foundation for many of the limitations that courts have con-
strued federal constitutional rights to have-consider time, place and
manner restrictions on speech, 50 or the obscenity limitation.5 1
The soft version of the Ninth Amendment involves a balancing
enquiry5 2 that resembles, in some respects, a European-style propor-
tionality analysis. 53 Even more analogous is the reasoning by which
the Supreme Court of Canada implements Section 1 of the Canadian
Charter of Rights, which provides: "The Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject
only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstra-
bly justified in a free and democratic society." Peter Hogg notes that
this general limitation on the reach of enumerated rights reflects the
influence of similar limitations on the rights guaranteed by the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the European
Convention on Human Rights. 54
D. Which Version?
Recall that before articulating two visions of the Ninth Amend-
ment's function, I posed a series of questions about how the text of
the amendment should be interpreted. The hard and soft versions do
not exhaust the combinations of answers that might be given to those
50 Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 298-99 (1984).
51 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 36-37 (1973).
52 See generally Alexander T. Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing,
96 YALE L.J. 943 (1987).
53 See Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, pt. I, art. 9, § 4, 2003
O.J. (C 169) 1, 10 ("Under the principle of proportionality, the content and form of
Union action shall not exceed what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the
Constitution.").
54 PETER W. HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA 728 (2001). See Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, arts. 8
§ 2, 9 § 2, 10 § 2, 11 § 2, 15 § 1, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953)
(as amended by Protocol No. 4, Sept. 16, 1963, art. 2 §§ 3-4); International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, arts. 4 § 1, 12 § 3, 14 § 1, 18 § 3, 19 § 3, 21,
22 § 2, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976).
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questions. Other combinations may be tenable; in describing the
hard and soft versions, I seek merely to identify the most plausible
combinations of answers.
Adopting the soft version of Ninth Amendment interpretation
would make little appreciable change to judicial reasoning in federal
constitutional adjudication. It is a call to do what courts have instinc-
tively done. Adopting the hard version of Ninth Amendment inter-
pretation would, on the other hand, clearly call for some landmarks of
constitutional adjudication to be decided differently.
The hard version will appeal to those who dislike applying balanc-
ing tests to interpret ostensibly absolute constitutional rights.55 The
soft version will be favored by those who consider such tests integral to
asking what federal constitutional rights mean. What "the freedom of
speech" means, they will observe, is inevitably a function of the rela-
tive value we accord the human interests with which free expression is
in tension. Prohibitions of expression ranging from perjury, false ad-
vertising, and obscenity, to the rump of defamation law, survive only
because the interests that underlie them have been weighed against
the interest that underlies the First Amendment and have been found
weightier.
As I shall describe below, the ratification debates focused on one
particular way in which constitutionalizing some rights might nega-
tively affect other rights. That possible negative effect was foreclosed
by the Tenth Amendment. The Founders did not focus on other neg-
ative effects, yet they chose to add the Ninth Amendment. Doing so
made sense only if the Founders wished to guard against whatever
other negative effects constitutionalizing some rights might have on
other rights. But which version of the Ninth Amendment's tension-
resolving role does history support?
III. THE HISTORY OF ADOPTION
A. The Ratification Debates
The Ninth and Tenth Amendments were responses to arguments
made during the debate over ratification of the 1787 Constitution as
to whether a bill of rights ought to be added. The shared concern of
those arguments was that constitutionalizing some rights would leave
other legal rights less protected than before. To the extent the con-
55 See Edmond Cahn, Justice Black and First Amendment "Absolutes" A Public Inter-
view, 37 N.Y.U. L. REv. 549, 557 (1962); cf U.S. CONST. amend. V (prohibiting unrea-
sonable searches and seizures, which explicitly invites a balancing of interests).
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cern was expressed in this general form, the Ninth Amendment re-
sponded directly to it.
When the leading federalist opponents of a bill of rights sought
to explain how constitutionalizing some rights might undermine
other rights, they focused on the reach of federal powers. Listing fed-
eral constitutional rights, they argued, would undermine the existing
constitutional enumeration of federal powers, by implying that federal
power extended beyond its enumerated subjects to everything except
the listed constitutional rights. In Pennsylvania, James Wilson put the
point succinctly:
A Bill of Rights annexed to a constitution is an enumeration of the
powers reserved. If we attempt an enumeration, every thing that is
not enumerated is presumed to be given. The consequence is, that
an imperfect enumeration would throw all implied power into the
scale of the government, and the rights of the people would be ren-
dered incomplete. 56
According to Wilson, listing federal constitutional rights would
imply that only power to impair those rights was kept from govern-
ment. All other powers would implicitly pass to the federal govern-
ment, undermining the constitutional enumeration of federal powers.
In North Carolina, James Iredell expressed the same concern that
the constitutional enumeration of powers might be undermined:
But when it is evident that the exercise of any power not given up
would be a usurpation, it would be not only useless, but dangerous,
to enumerate a number of rights which are not intended to be
given up; because it would be implying, in the strongest manner,
that every right not included in the exception might be impaired by
the government without usurpation; and it would be impossible to
enumerate every one.
57
When Iredell spoke of usurpation, he meant exercise of powers
not delegated in the constitutional enumeration of federal powers.
Under the 1787 Constitution, he argued, the federal government was
prevented from tampering with myriad important individual rights.
How was it prevented from impairing those rights? By the fact that it
had only been given a very modest set of powers. Many individual
rights were protected from the federal government not because they
56 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 10, at 436.
57 4 id. at 167; see also Alexander Contee Hanson, Remarks on the Proposed Plan of a
Federal Government, in PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION 241, 243 (Paul Leicester Ford
ed., Burt Franklin 1971) (1888) (" [W]e will not suffer it to be understood, that their
newfangled federal head shall domineer with the powers not excepted by their pre-
cious Bill of Rights.").
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were federal constitutional rights, but because the federal government's
powers did not reach far enough to trouble those rights anyway. Ire-
dell did not believe that the Supreme Court could recognize federal
constitutional rights unless those rights were enumerated in the Con-
stitution. He was a textualist, as he made clear in his riposte to the
florid natural rights prose of his colleague Samuel Chase in Calder v.
Bull.5 8
It has been the policy of all the American states, which have, individ-
ually, framed their state constitutions since the revolution, and of
the people of the United States, when they framed the Federal Con-
stitution, to define with precision the objects of the legislative
power, and to restrain its exercise within marked and settled bound-
aries.... If... the Legislature of the Union, or the Legislature of
any member of the Union, shall pass a law, within the general scope
of their constitutional power, the Court cannot pronounce it to be
void, merely because it is, in their judgment, contrary to the princi-
ples of natural justice. The ideas of natural justice are regulated by
no fixed standard: the ablest and the purest of men have differed
upon the subject; and all that the Court could properly say, in such
an event, would be, that the Legislature (possessed of an equal right
of opinion) had passed an act which, in the opinion of the judges,
was inconsistent with the abstract principles of natural justice.5 9
Earlier in the North Carolina convention's debate, Iredell specu-
lated that, were a bill of rights adopted, a future federal government
58 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 398-99 (1798). In 1787, Iredell wrote the following in
private correspondence:
Without an express Constitution the powers of the Legislature would un-
doubtedly have been absolute (as the Parliament in Great Britain is held to
be), and any act passed not inconsistent with natural justice (for that curb is
avowed by the judges even in England), would have been binding on the
people.
2 GRIFFITH JOHN McREE, LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE OF JAMES IREDELL, ONE OF THE
ASSOCIATE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT 172 (Peter Smith 1949) (1857). Suzanna
Sherry contends that this passage shows Iredell "clearly viewed a written constitution
as supplementing natural law rather than replacing it with a single instrument."
Sherry, supra note 35, at 1143. On the contrary, Iredell was merely acknowledging
that where no written constitutional scheme existed, courts in the common law tradi-
tion had recognized that legislative supremacy was a principle of the common law, a
principle that might yield to other fundamental common law principles in some cir-
cumstances. See, most famously, the pronouncement of Sir Edward Coke in Dr. Bon-
ham's Case, 8 Coke Rep. 107 (1610). As Iredell made clear in Calder v. Bull, courts
constituted under, and charged with upholding, "an express Constitution" had no
warrant to find limits on legislative power beyond those specified in the constitutional
text.
59 Calder, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 399.
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might respond in the following fashion t-, claims that it had exceeded
its delegated powers:
"We live at a great distance from the time when this Constitution
was established. We can judge of it much better by the ideas of it
entertained at the time, than by any ideas of our own. The bill of
rights, passed at that time, showed that the people did not think
every power retained which was not given, else this bill of rights was
not only useless, but absurd .... So long as the rights enumerated
in the bill of rights remain unviolated, you have no reason to
complain."60
The force of the federalist argument that listing constitutional
rights could imply almost plenary powers was widely acknowledged.
Even bill of rights supporters articulated it. At the Virginia Ratifica-
tion Convention, Patrick Henry asked:
What is the inference when you enumerate the rights which you are
to enjoy? That those not enumerated are relinquished .... Other
essential rights-what are they? The world will say that you intend
to give them up. When you go into an enumeration of your rights,
and stop that enumeration, the inevitable conclusion is, that what is
omitted is intended to be surrendered. 6 1
For Henry, however, the argument simply counted in favor of an
elaborate enumeration of rights. Certainly, he conceded, a bill of
rights would imply that federal power could reach all rights not in-
cluded in the bill. But that implication would merely reinforce a con-
struction of federal powers that was likely anyway. Listing
constitutional rights posed no extra danger, because the Constitu-
tion's attempt to enumerate federal powers was unlikely to be
effectual.
I have observed already, that the sense of the European nations, and
particularly Great Britain, is against the construction of rights being
retained which are not expressly relinquished. I repeat, that all na-
tions have adopted this construction-that all rights not expressly
and unequivocally reserved to the people are impliedly and inciden-
tally relinquished to rulers, as necessarily inseparable from the dele-
gated powers.6 2
George Mason was of the same view. "Unless there were a bill of
rights, implication might swallow up all our rights. '63 Henry and Ma-
son doubted that the 1787 Constitution's enumeration of powers
60 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 10, at 149.
61 3 id. at 587-88, 594.
62 3 id. at 445.
63 3 id.
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would stop the federal government from violating the individual
rights guaranteed in their state's bill of rights. Their speeches give no
credence to the possibility of courts recognizing federal constitutional
rights in the absence of a bill of rights.
James Madison's position at the Virginia Ratification Convention
was that which Wilson and Iredell had taken in their states-that the
1787 document's enumeration of powers was a sufficient safeguard,
and that adding a bill of rights would actually expand federal power
by implication. "If an enumeration be made of our rights, will it not
be implied that every thing omitted is given to the general govern-
ment? Has not the honorable gentleman admitted that an imperfect
enumeration is dangerous? 64
John Marshall supportively foreshadowed the reasoning of Mar-
bury v. Madison65 when explaining why the constitutional enumeration
of powers was meaningful:
Has the government of the United States power to make laws on
every subject?... Can they go beyond the delegated powers? If they
were to make a law not warranted by any of the powers enumerated,
it would be considered by the judges as an infringement of the Con-
stitution which they are to guard. They would not consider such a
law as coming under their jurisdiction. They would declare it
void.66
When the opponents of a bill of rights chose to be particular
about how a bill of rights might deny or disparage other rights, they
said it would thwart the attempt made in the Constitution to limit fed-
eral powers. Listing constitutional rights would imply that federal
power extended to everything except the listed rights. Prominent
proponents of a bill of rights accepted this. They remained propo-
nents, however, because they thought the attempt to enumerate fed-
eral powers was doomed to failure anyway. No one favored allowing a
bill of rights to have negative implications for the status of legal rights
that did not make the constitutional list. Hence the ease with which a
general exclusion of negative implications was added to the list ulti-
mately adopted.
B. James Madison in the First Congress
On June 8, 1789, James Madison rose to address the House of
Representatives in the First Congress to meet under the Constitution.
Won over to the case for a bill of rights by the weight of popular senti-
64 3 id. at 620; see also 3 id. at 626.
65 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803).
66 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supa note 10, at 553.
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ment and the advocacy of Thomas Jefferson, 67 he led its cause in the
House. He proposed a series of resolutions for amendments to the
new Constitution. His fourth proposed resolution included most of
the language that became the Bill of Rights. It ended with the follow-
ing clause:
The exceptions here or elsewhere in the constitution, made in favor
of particular rights, shall not be so construed as to diminish the just
importance of other rights retained by the people; or as to enlarge
the powers delegated by the constitution; but either as actual limita-
tions of such powers, or as inserted merely for greater caution.68
Madison's words in this proposed fourth resolution contain two
prohibitions-the first is general, the second specific. First, listing
federal constitutional rights shall not negatively affect the status of
rights that did not make the list. Explicit guarantees of certain rights
shall not be construed "to diminish the just importance of other rights
retained by the people." Second, listing federal constitutional rights
shall not have one particular negative effect on rights that did not
make the list. Explicit guarantees of certain rights shall not be con-
strued "to enlarge the powers delegated by the Constitution." This
was the possible negative effect that had been recognized and debated
in the ratification conventions.
Madison's concern in proposing the last clause of his fourth reso-
lution was for the status of legal rights not included in the Bill of
Rights. His proposal and his explanation of it suggest he sought to
avoid all negative effects that listing federal constitutional rights might
have on other rights. He did not seek to elevate such other rights
beyond the status they already had. He sought to preserve that status:
It has been objected also against a Bill of Rights, that, by enumerat-
ing particular exceptions to the grant of power, it would disparage
67 See ADRIENNE Kocti, JEFFERSON AND MADISON: THE GREAT COLLABORATION
51-56 (1964); Stuart Leibiger, James Madison and Amendments to the Constitution,
1787-1789: "Parchment Barriers, "59J. S. LEGAL HIST. 441, 454-55 (1993).
68 1 CONG. REG. 428 (1789); see also 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 435 (Joseph Gales ed.,
1789). I quote directly from the Register wherever I give both citations.
Contrary to the assumptions of many scholars, Joseph Gales and W.W. Sea-
ton did not include all previously published debates when, beginning in
1834, they compiled the Annals of Congress. All other reports for the period
of Lloyd's coverage were ignored and his Congressional Register was reprinted
almost in its entirety.
Marion Tinling, Thomas Lloyd's Reports of the First Federal Congress, 18 (n.s.) WM. & MARY
Q. 519, 519-20 (1961). The compilers of the Annals replaced Lloyd's first semi-colon,
which separated the provision's general and specific prohibitions, with a comma.
Lloyd heard Madison speak.
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those rights which were not placed in that enumeration, and it
might follow by implication, that those rights which were not sin-
gled out, were intended to be assigned into the hands of the general
government, and were consequently insecure. This is one of the
most plausible arguments I have ever heard urged against the ad-
mission of a Bill of Rights into this system; but, I conceive, that may
be guarded against. I have attempted it, as gentlemen may see by
turning to the last clause of the 4th resolution. 69
Madison's explanation tracks the general and specific risks
against which his provision stood guard: that the Bill of Rights would
have negative effects upon other rights, and that the Bill of Rights
would imply federal powers that the Constitution had not delegated.
Both of these risks were of negative effects upon unlisted rights. But
the second was a separately identified subspecies of the first. It was
the particular way in which listing some rights might compromise
other rights that had been identified during the ratification debates.
It was the particular route to denial or disparagement that had been
most obvious to Madison. But Madison did not assume that it was the
only way that a bill of rights might diminish the status of other rights.
He provided both that listing federal constitutional rights should not
have negative effects on other rights, and that listing constitutional
rights should not have the particular negative effect he could foresee.
In 1987, a handwritten document by Roger Sherman was found
among Madison's papers in the Library of Congress. Sherman was a
member of the House Select Committee to which Madison's proposals
were referred. Randy Barnett has described the document as "a work-
ing draft of the Bill of Rights. '70 Its final paragraph reads as follows:
And the powers not delegated to the Government of the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the particular
States, are retained by the States respectively, nor shall any [sic] the
exercise of power by the Government of the United States particular
instances here in enumerated by way of caution, be construed to
imply the contrary.7 1
69 1 CONG. REG. 433 (1789); see also I ANNALS OF CONG. 439 (Joseph Gales ed.,
1789). In this quotation, the compilers of the Annals replaced the comma that fol-
lows "enumeration" with a semi-colon! See also 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 442 (statement of
Andrew Jackson).
70 Roger Sherman's Draft of the Bill of Rights, in 1 RIGHTS RETAINED, supra note 20, at
351, 351.
71 Id. at 352.
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The first half of this paragraph clearly tracks the Madisonian lan-
guage that ultimately became the Tenth Amendment. 72 It suggests
that Sherman thought "retained" a suitable description for residual
state powers, which perhaps supports a positivist reading of "retained"
rights. The second half of the paragraph, though garbled, also fo-
cuses on the reach of federal powers. It appears likely to have been
meant to address the risk that federal powers would be construed
more broadly because of the Bill of Rights. 73 Yet the Founders ulti-
mately chose not to frame the Ninth Amendment as a prohibition
against overbroad readings of federal powers. Instead, they provided
more generally that listing rights should not negatively affect unlisted
rights-through overbroad readings of federal powers, or (implicitly)
in any other way.
Madison's proposed language suggested that he was concerned
with more than the implied expansion of federal powers. He had a
broader concern about the effect of listing rights upon the status of
rights not listed. This evident concern has caused many commenta-
tors to conclude that the Ninth Amendment was meant to afford justi-
ciable federal constitutional status to unlisted rights, or to confirm
that those rights had that status already and should not be deprived of
it. But the very next paragraph of his speech reveals that this was defi-
nitely not what Madison meant to accomplish through the Ninth
Amendment. That paragraph begins with the following sentence: "It
has been said, that it is unnecessary to load the constitution with this
provision, because it was not found effectual in the constitution of the
particular states. '74 "This provision" meant the whole of Madison's
fourth resolution, that is, the whole of what was to become the Bill of
Rights. The state constitutions and bills of rights that antedated their
federal counterpart did not contain anything like the Ninth or Tenth
Amendments. Madison continued: "It is true, there are a few particu-
lar states in which some of the most valuable articles have not, at one
time or other, been violated; but it does not follow but they may have,
to a certain degree, a salutary effect against the abuse of power."75
This passage confirms that Madison was speaking of the whole Bill of
Rights, and it appears he meant to say that bills of rights might have a
72 The Tenth Amendment drew on the final clause of the eighth resolution that
Madison proposed to the first Congress. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 436 (Joseph Gales ed.,
1789) ("The powers not delegated by this constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
States, are reserved to the States respectively."). The adopted Tenth Amendment in-
cluded the additional words "or to the people."
73 See infra Part V.A.
74 1 CONG. REG. 433 (1789); 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 439 (Jospeh Gales ed., 1789).
75 1 CONG. REG. 433 (1789); 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 439 (Jospeh Gales ed., 1789).
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salutary effect even when sporadically flouted. But then came a more
robust reason to adopt the Bill.
If they are incorporated into the constitution, independent tribu-
nals of justice will consider themselves in a peculiar manner the
guardians of those rights; they will be an impenetrable bulwark
against every assumption of power in the legislative or executive;
they will be naturally led to resist every encroachment upon rights
expressly stipulated for in the constitution by the declaration of
rights. 76
Jack Rakove has suggested that "[t]he inspiration for this state-
ment came from [Thomas] Jefferson."7 7 In Jefferson's letter to
Madison of March 15, 1789, he observed, "In the arguments in favor
of a declaration of rights, you omit one which has great weight to me,
the legal check which it puts into the hands of the judiciary. '78
Madison's point was that enumeration makes rights judicially en-
forceable. That argument would not have been available to him, had
he actually contemplated, or thought his audience contemplated, that
courts would proclaim and enforce federal constitutional rights any-
way. Had Madison thought that rights would be implicitly constitu-
tionalized by the courts without a bill of rights, then adding a bill
would have had only a "salutary" effect. But Madison thought that
adding a bill of rights had a very substantive effect; he suggested that
enumeration was what let judges enforce rights.7 9 The judiciary
would "be naturally led to resist every encroachment upon rights ex-
pressly stipulated for in the Constitution by the declaration of rights."8 0
76 1 CONG. REG. 433-34 (1789); 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 439 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789).
77 JACK N. RAKoVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF
THE CONSTITUTION 335 (1996).
78 THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFrS, DEBATES, SOURCES, AND ORIGINS
660 (Neil H. Cogan ed., 1997) (quoting 14 THE PAPERS OF THOMASJEFFERSON 659-60
(Julian P. Boyd ed., 1950)).
79 Larry Kramer has argued persuasively that judicial review was not a structural
centerpiece of the 1787 Constitution. See Kramer, supra note 37 passim. But
Madison's speech made judicial review a key element of his case for a bill of rights.
See id. at 77, 124.
80 1 CONG. REG. 434 (1789) (emphasis added); 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 439 (Joseph
Gales ed., 1789) (emphasis added). Randy Barnett has claimed that the second provi-
sion in Roger Sherman's draft Bill of Rights "reflects the sentiment that came to be
expressed in the Ninth." Randy E. Barnett, Introduction: James Madison's Ninth Amend-
ment, in 1 RIGHTS RETAINED, supra note 20, at 1, 7 n.16. That provision reads:
The people have certain natural rights which are retained by them when
they enter into Society. Such are the rights of Conscience in matters of relig-
ion; of acquiring property, and of pursuing happiness & Safety; of Speaking,
writing and publishing their Sentiments with decency and freedom; of
peaceably assembling to consult their common good, and of applying to
2004]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
Perhaps Madison and Jefferson were merely unsure whether
courts would proclaim and enforce federal constitutional rights ab-
sent a bill of rights. The nascent practice of judicial review in the
states left the question in doubt.81 But Madison and Jefferson were
not agnostic about what they wanted courts to do. They wanted courts
to enforce federal constitutional rights, and proposed a bill of rights
to ensure that courts would do so. Would the Bill of Rights, with the
Ninth Amendment among its provisions, authorize courts to recog-
nize or create other federal constitutional rights? That is not what
Madison said. He said that the Bill of Rights would authorize courts
to protect "rights expressly stipulated for in the constitution by the decla-
ration of rights."8 2
One paragraph earlier in his speech, Madison had explained
what he sought to accomplish through the Ninth Amendment. 3 No-
where in that explanation did he mention judicial review. In the
Ninth Amendment, Madison sought to preserve the existing status of
legal rights that were missing out on inclusion in the Bill of Rights.
Did he think that the existing status of unlisted rights could be "fed-
eral constitutional"? At most, he was agnostic as to that question.
Maybe courts would treat some unlisted rights as federal constitu-
Government by petition or remonstrance for redress of grievances. Of these
rights therefore they Shall not be deprived by the Government of the united
States.
Id. See Roger Sherman's Draft of the Bill of Rights, supra note 70, at 351.
This provision looks much more like a precursor to the First Amendment, and to
the property parts of the Fifth Amendment. The guarantees of the First Amendment,
and the property rights guarantees of the Fifth, are not otherwise reflected in Sher-
man's draft. The provision appears to record deliberations concerning what rights
ought to be expressly stipulated for. Ultimately the Founders framed the Fifth Amend-
ment's property rights protections around losing property rather than acquiring it,
but that hardly deprives this provision of precursor status. Only the draft's most gen-
eral phrase ("of pursuing happiness & Safety") failed to find reflection in the express
guarantees of the Bill of Rights. That obviously aspirational language echoed the
Declaration of Independence and was sensibly omitted from provisions that were in-
tended to bejusticiable federal constitutional rights. Far from supporting the case for
reading the Ninth Amendment to signal other federal constitutional rights, the argua-
bly inclusive language of this provision counts precisely against that case. Why? Be-
cause that inclusive language was dropped, leaving the First and Fifth Amendments to
guarantee discrete sets of federal constitutional rights.
81 SeeWILLIAM E. NELSON, MARBURY V. MADISON: THE ORIGINS AND LEGACY OFJUDI-
CIAL REVIEW 34-37 (2000); Sherry, supra note 35, at 1134-46; Suzanna Sherry, Natural
Law in the States, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 171, 182-222 (1992) [hereinafter Sherry, Natural
Law]; Suzanna Sherry, The Ninth Amendment: Righting an Unwritten Constitution, 64
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1001, 1003-07 (1988) [hereinafter Sherry, The Ninth Amendment].
82 1 CONG. REG. 434 (1789); 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 439 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789).
83 1 CONG. REG. 433 (1789); 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 439 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789).
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tional rights; maybe they would not. Madison's case for a bill of rights
implied at least doubt that courts would do so, and perhaps disagree-
ment with the claim that they could. Nowhere did Madison suggest or
imply that his Bill of Rights, with the Ninth Amendment among its
provisions, would authorize courts to articulate other federal constitu-
tional rights. Had Madison wished to achieve that result, he could
have deployed a direct prohibition ("rights retained by the people
shall not be infringed"), or a direct rule of construction ("the enumer-
ation of powers shall not be construed to disparage rights retained by
the people").
The Ninth Amendment's rule of construction did something dif-
ferent. It safeguarded the existing status of unlisted rights, whatever
that status was. It did not dictate what that status was. Courts could
work that out for themselves. If courts decided that other rights had
enjoyed federal constitutional status in 1789, then the Ninth Amend-
ment protected that status. If courts decided that only listed rights
had ever enjoyed federal constitutional status, then the Ninth Amend-
ment afforded no reason to quarrel with that conclusion. The language of
denial or disparagement is critical here. A right is not denied or dis-
paraged when it misses out on becoming something it has never been.
Madison's invocation of judicial review has been widely cele-
brated. His focus on judicial enforcement of constitutional text has,
however, been insufficiently appreciated. That understanding ofjudi-
cial review comports with his explanation of the Ninth Amendment,
just one paragraph earlier.
In Democracy and Distrust, John Hart Ely observes:
It would be a cheap shot to note that there is no legislative history
specifically indicating an intention that the Ninth Amendment was
to receive judicial enforcement. There was at the time of the origi-
nal Constitution little legislative history indicating that any particu-
lar provision was to receive judicial enforcement: the Ninth
Amendment was not singled out one way or the other.84
Ely is right that the Ninth Amendment was not treated by the
Founders as any more or less justiciable than other constitutional pro-
visions. But the legislative history of the Bill of Rights leaves no doubt
that judicial enforcement of listed rights was expected, indeed that it
was among the most important reasons for listing rights at all.
84 ELY, supra note 21, at 40.
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C. Conclusions for Interpretation
If the originalist project is to seek out evidence of how the gener-
ation who adopted the Ninth Amendment understood what they were
doing, then Madison's speech must be Exhibit A. And any interpreter
of the Ninth Amendment, whether self-consciously originalist or not,
should give the speech more weight than any other piece of history.
No explanation of what the provision did and did not do had more
influence on those who amended the Constitution to include its
words. Members of the House in the First Congress heard Madison
live. Conscientious senators and members of the ratifying state legisla-
tures would inevitably have read him-what source of guidance about
meaning could be more obvious than the speech through which the
provision was proposed? Madison's speech was published contempo-
raneously in Thomas Lloyd's Congressional Register. Lloyd published
his reports of the proceedings of the House of Representatives on a
weekly basis, commencing on May 6, 1789. "Most of the members of
the House and the Senate, the President, and many other influential
men subscribed .... -"85 And when they read Madison's speech, they
found in adjoining paragraphs an assertion that the Ninth Amend-
ment protected unlisted rights from disparagement and a claim that
listing rights was what ensured federal constitutional status. Whatever
Madison meant by not disparaging unlisted rights, he did not mean
that courts should treat those rights as listed.
The Gazette of the United States published the following report of
Madison's speech:
Mr. Madison further observed, That the proportion of Representa-
tives had been objected to-and particularly the discretionary
power of diminishing the number.-There is an impropriety in the
Legislatures' determining their own compensation, With a power to
vary its amount.-The rights of conscience; liberty of the press; and
trial by jury, should be so secured, as to put it out of the power of
the Legislature to infringe them.-Fears respecting the judiciary system,
should be entirely done away-and an express declaration made, that all
rights not expressly given up, are retained.-He wished, that a declara-
tion upon these points might be attended to-and if the Constitu-
tion can be made better in the view of its most sanguine supporters,
by making some alterations in it, we shall not act the part of wise
men not to do it-He therefore moved for the appointment of a
committee, to propose amendments, which should be laid before
85 Tinling, supra note 68, at 527.
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the Legislatures of the several States, agreeably to the 5th article of
the Constitution.8 6
Thus even in the attenuated report of Madison's speech pro-
duced by a leading newspaper and reprinted elsewhere, two critical
points appear. First, the proposed Bill of Rights would be enforced by
judicial review. Second, the proposed provision concerning retained
rights was intended to make clear that the federal government had no
powers beyond those delegated to it. Only through the original Con-
stitution's delegation had the people "expressly given up" power to
compromise their rights. Readers of the Gazette who later encoun-
tered the Ninth and Tenth Amendments would have understood
those provisions to concern rights that the federal Constitution, in all
its provisions, was meant to leave untouched and unaddressed. The
Ninth Amendment's concern was framed more generally than the
Tenth's, and thus the language of the Ninth Amendment covered
more than the particular negative effect on retained rights that
Madison specifically sought to preclude.
What conclusions can we draw from this history? First, the Ninth
Amendment does not say that unlisted rights have federal constitutional
status. It says only that listing federal constitutional rights must not
negatively affect the status of unlisted rights, whatever that status is.
The Ninth Amendment neither urges nor precludes textualism. Sec-
ond, the Ninth Amendment does overlap with the Tenth, but extends
further. The Founders were concerned about a particular negative
effect that constitutionalizing some rights might have on other rights.
They precluded that effect in the Tenth Amendment. But the Foun-
ders had a general concern that constitutionalizing some rights not
have negative effects on other rights. They precluded those effects in
the Ninth Amendment.
What other negative effects does the Ninth Amendment pre-
clude? Certainly it precludes reading federal powers more broadly be-
cause of the Bill of Rights. It also precludes reading the Bill of Rights in
ways that "deny or disparage" rights "retained by the people." I have
discussed hard and soft versions of this prohibition; does history help
us choose between them?
The historical record better supports the hard version of the
Ninth Amendment's tension-resolving role. The Founders were con-
cerned about the fate of legal rights they already had, not about opti-
86 Sketch of the Proceedings of Congress in the House of Representatives of the United States,
GAZETrrE U.S., June 10, 1789, at 2 (emphasis added), reprinted in CONN. J., June 17,
1789, at 1 (emphasis added).
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mizing future flexibility to create legal rights.8 7 References to the risk
of unlisted rights being "assigned into the hands of the general gov-
ernment"8 8 necessarily implied that the federal government was not
the source of those unlisted rights-their source had to be common
law, other state law, or nature. All the hand-wringing about imperfect
enumerations of rights also implied that the unlisted rights in the
Founders' sights were plausible candidates for listing (if only they had
been thought of).89 That seems to support the hard version's narrow
conception of rights. For originalists, the choice is clear.
The Founders' lack of specific attention to the problem of ten-
sion between constitutionally-listed rights and other rights "retained
by the people" is thus readily explicable. The guarantees in the Bill of
Rights originally applied only against the federal government. In the
Ninth Amendment, the Founders provided that listing rights in the
Constitution must not have negative effects on other rights "retained
by the people." The Founders probably understood other rights re-
tained by the people to be other rights retained in the laws of the
states, that is, other existing rights under state law, including common
law. State laws protecting ("retaining") other rights (such as the right
to reputation) were not subject to challenge for inconsistency with the
federal Bill of Rights. The Founders did not intend the Bill of Rights
to limit the lawmaking power of the states. Some individual rights
guarantees in the original Constitution did limit state power, notably
prohibitions of bills of attainder and of laws impairing the obligation
of contracts, 90 but these were hardly obvious candidates for competi-
tion with other state law rights.9 1 Further obscure potential for ten-
sion existed if rights "retained by the people" formed a federal
common law in 1789,92 or were codified by federal statute in respect
of federal territories. The Founders doubtless did not comprehend
87 See supra Part III.A.
88 1 CONG. REG. 433 (1789); 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 439 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789)
(statement of James Madison).
89 See 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 10, at 436 (statement of James Wilson); 3
id. at 620 (statement of James Madison); 4 id. at 167 (statement of James Iredell).
90 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
91 Madison's proposal that U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 be amended to include further
individual rights and limitations on state power failed. See I ANNALS OF CONG. 435
(Joseph Gales ed., 1789) ("No State shall violate the equal rights of conscience, or the
freedom of the press, or the trial by jury in criminal cases."). It was approved by the
House as "the equal fights of conscience, the freedom of speech or of the press, and
the right of trial by jury in criminal cases, shall not be infringed by any State," I id. at
755, but was rejected by the Senate. See AMAR, supra note 11, at 144 n.37.
92 SeeSwiftv. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 14-22 (1842), overruled by Erie R.R. Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 69-80 (1938). A federal court sitting prior to 1938 could have
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all arcane implications of a possible federal common law. At the
Founding, then, there was little apparent risk that how federal consti-
tutional rights were construed would negatively affect other rights "re-
tained by the people." But when the Fourteenth Amendment applied
federal constitutional rights to the states, 93 how those federal constitu-
tional rights were construed potentially affected other rights "retained
by the people. '94 The Fourteenth Amendment created a more signifi-
cant and appreciable risk of tension between federal constitutional
rights and "others retained by the people." Construction of federal
constitutional rights became visible as one of the ways in which listing
rights in the Constitution might disparage "others retained by the
people."
The generation whp adopted the Ninth Amendment almost cer-
tainly did not have in mind the problem of tension between federal
constitutional rights and other retained rights. Does their inattention
to the problem of tension mean that the Ninth Amendment does not
held that from 1789 the rights "retained by the people" had been protected by federal
common law.
93 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the juris-
diction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.
See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 146-62 (1968); Adamson v. California, 332
U.S. 46, 47-59 (1947); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 320-29 (1937); AmaR,
supra note 11, at 218-23.
94 If the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or Immunities Clause applies
against the states the privileges and immunities guaranteed in the original Constitu-
tion and Bill of Rights, O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 360-64 (1892) (Field, J., dis-
senting); AmAR, supra note 11, at 218-23, then the Ninth Amendment's rule for
construing those guarantees feeds through, and produces a uniform construction of
those guarantees vis-;I-vis both federal and state governments. If, however, the "incor-
poration" of "federal" rights against the states is achieved through the enumeration of
the Due Process Clause in the Fourteenth Amendment, Duncan, 391 U.S. at 146-62;
Adamson, 332 U.S. at 47-59; Palko, 302 U.S. at 320-29, then the Ninth Amendment
applies to construction of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause as a pro-
spective interpretive rule that the Fourteenth Amendment could have changed but
did not. See Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutoy Interpretation, 115
HARv. L. Riv. 2085, 2114-20 (2002). On this view, the hard version of the Ninth
Amendment's tension-resolving role might call for determining the rights retained by
the people of the states as of 1868 rather than 1789 for the purpose of construing the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Attribution of incorporation to
the Privileges or Immunities Clause does, however, seem much more plausible.
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apply to that problem? No-they spoke with sufficient generality to
cover the case. When a change in the law produced actual cases of
tension between federal constitutional rights and other rights re-
tained by the people, the Ninth Amendment insisted that the tensions
be resolved in ways that did not deny or disparage the other rights
retained by the people. To conclude that the Ninth Amendment ap-
plies to methods of denial or disparagement unforeseen at the Found-
ing is surely less controversial than to conclude that some other
provision of the Bill of Rights applies to a technology unimagined at
the Founding. When the Founders protected speech in the First
Amendment and prohibited cruel and unusual punishments in the
Eighth Amendment, they succeeded in protecting and prohibiting, re-
spectively, all future forms of the phenomena, not just the ones they
specifically had in mind.95 The possibilities that the First Amendment
protects television broadcasts and that the Eighth Amendment pro-
hibits certain uses of electrocution are not excluded just because the
Founders were not specifically thinking of those species of speech and
punishment. Likewise, when the Founders prohibited the enumera-
tion of rights from being construed to deny or disparage retained
rights, they succeeded in prohibiting all future forms of the
phenomenon.
IV. THE Two VERSIONS COMPARED: NEw YORK TIMES V. SULLIVAN
To examine the practical operation of the Ninth Amendment,
both hard and soft versions, let us consider the legal landscape against
which the Supreme Court decided New York Times v. Sullivan.96 Harry
Kalven recounted that the Alabama defamation law there at issue re-
sembled the common law in most other states. "The rule of fair com-
ment in Alabama, like that in the majority of jurisdictions in this
country, limit[ed] the privilege to the expression of defamatory opin-
ions based on facts that are established as true."9 7 This comported
with the longstanding solicitude of the English common law for rights
of reputation. In his Commentaries, Blackstone declared that the rights
of the English people "may be reduced to three principal or primary
articles; the right of personal security, the right of personal liberty;
95 See Michael S. Moore, A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REV.
277, 338-58 (1985); Michael S. Moore, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 63 S.
CAL. L. REV. 107, 135-37 (1989).
96 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
97 Harry Kalven, Jr., The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of the
First Amendment, " 1964 Sup. CT. REV. 191, 195.
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and the right of private property."9 8 Under the rubric of personal
security, he observed, "The security of his reputation or good name
from the arts of detraction and slander, are rights to which every man
is entitled, by reason and natural justice; since without these it is im-
possible to have the perfect enjoyment of any other advantage or
right."9 9
The value of freedom to speak is undermined if a besmirched
reputation evacuates one's audience. But freedom of speech matters
too. Blackstone described how the common law reconciled rights to
speech with rights to reputation. The common law's solution was to
eschew prior restraints but to afford robust ex post remedies for defa-
mation. "The liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature of a
free state; but this consists in laying no previous restraints upon publi-
cations, and not in freedom from censure for criminal matter when
published."1 00
On any plausible reading of the Ninth Amendment, the right to
reputation falls among the "others retained by the people." The right
to reputation was retained in the laws of the people of the states,1 0 '
but not listed in the federal Constitution. By contrast, the right to
freedom of speech was both retained and constitutionalized. The
state laws that protect and foster a right to reputation are clearly in
tension with a constitutional right to freedom of speech. Had the
Ninth Amendment been understood to address this tension, how
might New York Times v. Sullivan have been argued?
The brief for the plaintiff-respondent, Mr. Sullivan, would have
articulated the Ninth Amendment basis for his right to rely on state
defamation law: The enumeration in the Constitution of the freedom
of speech shall not be construed to deny or disparage the right to
reputation retained by the people through defamation law. Sullivan
might then have argued for the hard version of the Ninth Amend-
ment. In other words, he might have argued that the freedom of
speech cannot be construed to diminish the protections for reputa-
tion that existed at common law in 1789. The State of Alabama was,
of course, free to reduce or eliminate those protections through its
98 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 1, at *129.
99 1 id. at *134.
100 4 id. at *151; see also LEONARD W. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS 13-14
(1985).
101 Pennsylvania even acknowledged the right in its constitution. See PA. CONST.
art. I, § 1 ("That all men are born equally free and independent, and have certain
inherent and indefeasible rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending
life and liberty, of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property and reputation, and
of pursuing their own happiness.").
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own lawmaking processes. But to the extent that those protections
were retained by the state, they could not be diminished through the
construction of federal constitutional rights. Provided that the state
law protections on which Sullivan relied were not relevantly more gen-
erous than a plaintiff would have enjoyed in 1789, he was entitled to
rely on them.
The defendant-petitioners might have argued as follows for the
soft version of the Ninth Amendment: The retained right to reputa-
tion is not denied or disparaged if it is accorded the weight that it
deserves within an optimal array of individual rights. The Ninth
Amendment means that the interest underlying defamation law must
be accorded its appropriate weight. If the principle of the Ninth
Amendment were not recognized, then a constitutional guarantee of
freedom of speech would end state defamation law entirely. There is
only one reason to read down "the freedom of speech" to accommo-
date any defamation law. That reason is the importance of the human
interest in reputation. The Ninth Amendment tells the Court how to
construe the freedom of speech when that freedom is in tension with
another human interest. The Court must weigh the interest in free-
dom of speech against the interest in reputation, must decide what
constitutes the optimal accommodation between those interests, and
must construe the freedom of speech accordingly.
The plaintiff-respondent might have answered that the common
law of 1789 settled the accommodation between interests in speech
and reputation, and that the Ninth Amendment requires the Court to
respect the common law position. As a fall-back, he might have ar-
gued that Alabama defamation law did reflect an optimal accommoda-
tion between the interests in speech and reputation. Any individual
right may be cynically misused, but the Court should not permit dis-
gust with a party in litigation to affect its assessment of the relative
human interests in speech and reputation.
If the Court had accepted the soft version of the Ninth Amend-
ment, the case would likely have been decided much as it was. The
soft version essentially describes the reasoning process in which the
Court actually engaged. The Court weighed the competing interests
underlying rights to speech and to reputation, and construed the free-
dom of speech in a way that worked an accommodation between
those interests. Had the Court simply deferred to the absolute lan-
guage of the First Amendment, then state defamation law would have
been completely swept away. In fact, it was not. The Court merely
narrowed the constitutionally permissible reach of state defamation
[VOL. 79:2
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law through its "public official" and "actual malice" criteria. 10 2 That
was a limiting construction of the constitutional right to freedom of
speech. The Court's construction reflected reasoning that, in Justice
Goldberg's words, "[p]urely private defamation has little to do with
the political ends of a self-governing society. The imposition of liabil-
ity for private defamation does not abridge the freedom of public
speech or any other freedom protected by the First Amendment."
1 0 3
In other words, the interest underlying freedom of speech is less
weighty when that speech concerns private individuals than when it
concerns public figures. Hence the scales tip in favor of the interest
underlying the right to reputation, and private defamation remains
actionable.
Justices Goldberg, Black, and Douglas read the First Amendment
to leave less room for state defamation law than did the majority, but
even they did not simply hold it invalid en bloc. Their proposed abso-
lute immunity was only for speech about public officials performing
public duties. 10 4
Under the hard version of the Ninth Amendment, New York Times
v. Sullivan was wrongly decided. The Court in Near v. Minnesota ex rel.
Olsen'05 had read the First Amendment in a way that reconciled ten-
sion between rights to speech and rights to reputation much as the
old common law had done. Chief Justice Hughes's majority opinion
condemned equitable injunctions effecting prior restraints on speech
in the following terms: "Public officers, whose character and conduct
remain open to debate and free discussion in the press, find their
remedies for false accusation in actions under libel laws providing for
redress and punishment, and not in proceedings to restrain the publi-
cation of newspapers and periodicals." 10 6 To the extent that New York
Times v. Sullivan made inroads on ex post remedies for defamation, it
violated the hard version of the Ninth Amendment. Under that ver-
sion, individual rights that were enjoyed under state law in 1789 are
brittle limits on the construction of federal constitutional rights. Pro-
vided Alabama defamation law was not relevantly more generous to
Sullivan than state law in 1789 would have been, he was entitled to its
benefit.
102 N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964); cf id. at 293-95 (Black &
Douglas, JJ., concurring); id. at 298-300 (Goldberg & Douglas, JJ., concurring in the
result).
103 Id. at 301-02 (Goldberg & Douglas, JJ., concurring in the result).
104 See id. at 293-97 (Black & Douglas, JJ., concurring); 297-305 (Goldberg &
Douglas, JJ., concurring in the result).
105 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
106 Id. at 718-19.
620 NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW [VOL. 79:2
As Sullivan illustrates, the hard and soft versions of the Ninth
Amendment carry very different implications for the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence. The soft version really just describes the reasoning
process in which the Court has actually engaged when construing the
Bill of Rights. The soft version sets up a balancing enquiry every time
a constitutional right comes into tension with a nonconstitutional law
that fosters a nonconstitutional right. The Court has, throughout its
history, observed this version of the Ninth Amendment's injunction
sub silentio. Repeatedly, the Court has resolved tensions by acknowl-
edging the just importance of the nonconstitutional right, and settling
upon a construction of the constitutional right that seeks to serve the
interests underlying each right to the fullest extent possible, making
each accommodate the other.
Examples in the First Amendment context are legion, and will
doubtless be joined by the Court's resolution of the national "do-not-
call" litigation that is currently winding its way through the lower fed-
eral courts. 10 7 Laws that prohibit public nuisances create rights to be
free of those nuisances that may clash with rights to self-expression.1 0 8
"Content-neutral"judicial analyses of such laws reflect an accommoda-
tion between the human interests they serve and the human interest
in self-expression.
When attention turns to constitutional rights beyond the First
Amendment, judicial interpreters are regularly required to reconcile
the Constitution's provision for security of person and property from
government, and the provision made by lesser laws for security of per-
son and property from other persons. The soft version of the Ninth
Amendment enjoins the courts to consider our need for security from
each other when deciding how secure the Constitution makes us from
government.I0 9
The hard version of the Ninth Amendment effectively creates a
set of defeasible limitations on federal constitutional rights. Rights
retained by the people in their laws limit construction of federal con-
stitutional rights. The hard version is, therefore, only plausible if the
rights retained by the people are a fixed set, beyond the power of
governments to expand. The hard version is plausible if the rights
retained by the people are those "secured within the customary consti-
tutional tradition" 110 in 1789-rights "deeply rooted in this Nation's
107 See supra note 47.
108 See, e.g., Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536
U.S. 150, 160-64 (2002); Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 714-18 (2000).
109 See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
110 Kramer, supra note 37, at 40.
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history and tradition."' 1 These rights, to the extent not constitution-
ally listed, depend upon the ongoing sustenance of common law or
statutes or state constitutions. Subject to applicable state constitu-
tional limitations, state legislatures may remove these rights at any
time. But to the extent that legislatures wish to provide for them, or
to allow the common law to continue to do so, these rights limit con-
struction of federal constitutional rights. Retained rights cannot, how-
ever, operate as limits to construction beyond those rights' historic
breadth.
To be plausible, the hard version can apply only to nonconstitu-
tional rights that were framed historically as explicit legal rights, and
for which the law historically provided judicial remedies. It cannot, as
can the soft version, apply to other laws just because those laws serve
human interests. Thus the laws that empower executives, state and
federal, to protect us from each other could not operate to limit con-
struction of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments under the hard ver-
sion, even if they serve a historically recognized "natural right to
security from the corporal insults of menaces, assaults, beating, and
wounding."112 Not every search or seizure authorized by state law
need be held "reasonable."1' 13
V. OTHER INTERPRETATIONS COMPARED
A. The Ninth Amendment's Rule of Construction
The Ninth Amendment is a rule of construction. Its operative
verb makes that clear:'1 4 "The enumeration in the Constitution of
certain rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage others re-
tained by the people."1 5 All interpreters agree that the amendment
concerns how we should construe the fact that some rights have been
listed in the Constitution. That fact should not be construed to have
negative effects on other rights.
If the fact of listing rights is construed to concede federal power
to do everything except invade the listed rights, then the Ninth
Amendment is violated-but so is the Tenth. If the fact of listing
rights is construed to have any other negative effect on nonconstitu-
tional rights, then the Ninth Amendment is violated. The Founders
did not focus on other ways that listing constitutional rights might
111 Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977).
112 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 1, at *134.
113 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
114 See Rosenkranz, supra note 94, at 2090 n.12.
115 U.S. CONST. amend. IX (emphasis added).
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negatively affect nonconstitutional rights. But we can think of at least
two: (1) by implying that federal powers should be construed more
broadly than they otherwise would be; and (2) by implying that listed
rights should be construed more broadly than they were before list-
ing, at the expense of other rights.
Identifying the second of these two negative effects has been the
goal of this Article. The first negative effect has been recognized by
other scholars; it is closely related to the "confirming enumerated
powers" explanation of the Ninth Amendment, but does not render
the amendment redundant. It is a "more subtle thesis"' 1 6 that the
Ninth Amendment prevents use of the Bill of Rights as a reason to
construe enumerated federal powers broadly. How could the Bill of
Rights be so used? Through an inference that the Bill of Rights had
been necessary in order to rescue its listed rights from the clutches of
enumerated federal power. Such an inference seems natural enough.
It comports with our expectation that law is not meant to be redun-
dant. If the Founders wished to guard against the inference, they
needed to rebut it explicitly. Akhil Amar endorses this explanation of
the Ninth Amendment in the following terms:
The Tenth says that Congress must point to some explicit or im-
plicit enumerated power before it can act; and the Ninth addresses
the closely related but distinct question of whether such express or
implied enumerated power in fact exists .... Thus, for example, we
must not infer from our First Amendment that Congress was ever
given legislative power in the first place to regulate religion in the
states, or to censor speech.1 17
It is unclear how widely the "broad construction" risk was appreci-
ated among the Founders. During the ratification debates, the Consti-
tution's proponents insisted that the subjects of power conferred on
the federal government were inherently limited. This, they argued, suf-
ficiently safeguarded individual rights."l 8 That argument presup-
posed that the federal government's enumerated powers were
inherently not susceptible of conscientious broad interpretation. De-
bate raged as to whether the Constitution's enumeration of powers
116 See John Choon Yoo, Our Declaratoy Ninth Amendment, 42 EMORY LJ. 967, 988
(1993); see also McAffee, supra note 17, at 1307.
117 AmAR, supra note 11, at 124.
118 See, e.g., PENNSYLVANIA AND THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION: 1787-1788, at 143-44
(John Bach McMaster & Frederick D. Stone eds., Lancaster, Inquirer Printing Co.
1888) (citing a speech to the State House by James Wilson, Oct. 6, 1787); THE FEDER-
ALIST No. 84, at 515 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("The truth
is, after all the declamations we have heard, that the Constitution is itself, in every
rational sense, and to every useful purpose, A BILL OF RIGHTS.").
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would be taken seriously.' 19 The apparently shared assumption of the
debaters was that if that enumeration were taken seriously, it would be
effective to limit federal power and thus to protect rights. The Tenth
Amendment fully guarded against the specific risk that the enumera-
tion of powers would not be taken seriously. Alexander Hamilton in
The Federalist No. 84 did, however, identify the risk of disingenuously
broad construction of federal powers.
[B]ills of rights, in the sense and to the extent in which they are
contended for, are not only unnecessary in the proposed Constitu-
tion but would even be dangerous. They would contain various ex-
ceptions to powers which are not granted; and, on this very account,
would afford a colorable pretext to claim more than were granted.
For why declare that things shall not be done which there is no
power to do? Why, for instance, should it be said that the liberty of
the press shall not be restrained, when no power is given by which
restrictions may be imposed? I will not contend that such a provi-
sion would confer a regulating power; but it is evident that it would
furnish, to men disposed to usurp, a plausible pretence for claiming
that power. They might urge with a semblance of reason that the
Constitution ought not to be charged with the absurdity of provid-
ing against the abuse of an authority which was not given, and that
the provision against restraining the liberty of the press afforded a
clear implication that a power to prescribe proper regulations con-
cerning it was intended to be vested in the national government.
This may serve as a specimen of the numerous handles which would
be given to the doctrine of constructive powers, by the indulgence
of an injudicious zeal for bills of rights. 120
To the extent that Hamilton addressed disingenuously broad inter-
pretations of federal powers, he merely identified another way in
which the enumeration of federal powers might not be taken seri-
ously. To that extent, the Tenth Amendment obviated his concern.
But what of the possibility that conscientious interpreters of enumer-
ated federal powers might be lured into reading those powers too
broadly by the fact that the Constitution listed rights? Only the Ninth
Amendment met that concern. The recently discovered Sherman
draft hints through garbled language that a risk of federal powers be-
ing read overbroadly was indeed on the Founders' minds.1
2 1
The "broad construction" explanation does not leave the Ninth
Amendment a dead letter, but neither does it exhaust the function of
the amendment. The language of the Ninth Amendment would be
119 See supra Part III.
120 THE FEDERALIST No. 84, supra note 118, at 513-14 (Alexander Hamilton).
121 See Roger Sherman's Draft of the Bill of Rights, supra note 70, at 351-52.
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an oddly backhanded way to do no more than preclude an inference
about the breadth of federal powers. If the Ninth Amendment were,
like the Tenth, just about the reach of federal powers, why did it not
simply say so? "The powers delegated to the United States shall not be
construed more broadly because of the enumeration of certain
rights." That seemed to be what Sherman was attempting to say in his
draft.122 Why did he not succeed in keeping the provision's explicit
focus on the construction of federal powers? And why did the Ninth
Amendment speak of the "enumeration in the Constitution of certain
rights," not simply of the enumeration of rights in the foregoing eight
amendments?
Debate over a bill of rights seems, from the language used in the
Ninth Amendment, to have triggered a general concern among the
Founders about the effects that constitutionalizing some rights would
have upon other rights. Implicitly expanding federal powers, whether
by ignoring their textual enumeration or by construing that enumera-
tion broadly, was one way in which nonconstitutional rights might be
"denied or disparaged." But was it the only way in which constitution-
alizing some rights might deny or disparage other rights? The lan-
guage of the Ninth Amendment seems to reflect a broader concern
that constitutionalizing some rights not have negative effects upon
other rights. By making general provision against such negative ef-
fects, the Founders protected against more than they concretely
foresaw.
What other negative effects have surfaced since? The practice of
judicial review has revealed another. Listing some rights in the Con-
stitution may negatively affect other rights by prompting courts to ex-
pand the listed rights at the other rights' expense. The Founders
could be forgiven for not focusing on this negative effect, for our own
appreciation of it is a creature of judicial review over two centuries.
Moreover, it is an effect that flows from the Fourteenth Amendment's
application of federal constitutional rights to state law. The Founders
doubtless did not foresee this development, but its effects were subject
to the Founders' general prohibition of negative effects on rights "re-
tained by the people."
Are there others? Perhaps the Ninth Amendment tells Congress
and the Executive that in deciding what laws to enact, they should
consider the importance of unlisted rights no less because certain
rights have been listed. But is failing to treat unlisted rights as federal
constitutional rights a negative effect, a denial or disparagement? Yes,
if listing some rights were the only reason for not treating other rights
122 See id.
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as federal constitutional rights. No, if other rights would never have
been treated as federal constitutional rights anyway. The impetus for
a bill of rights fed on an understanding that listing rights in the Con-
stitution was necessary to ensure that they were enforceable federal
constitutional rights. The judiciary were expected "to resist every en-
croachment upon rights expressly stipulated for in the constitution by
the declaration of rights.' 123 Nothing in the history of the Ninth
Amendment suggests that the Founders were trying to give courts a
license to continue the enumeration project.
B. How are Listed Rights to be Construed?
In this Article, I have argued that the Ninth Amendment some-
times instructs readers to construe (or to consider construing) federal
constitutional rights more narrowly than those readers might other-
wise do. The amendment issues that instruction when federal consti-
tutional rights are in tension with other rights "retained by the
people."
Laurence Tribe and Michael Dorf appear to have made precisely
the opposite claim. They agree that "[t] he Ninth Amendment creates
and confers no rights; it is a rule of interpretation."1 24 But they seem
to think that the Ninth Amendment invites readers to construe fed-
eral constitutional rights more broadly than those readers might other-
wise do. Consider the following passage:
It tells each reader: whatever else you're going to do to explain why
"liberty" does not include the grandmother's right to live with her
grandchild-whatever else you're going to say to conclude that the
"privileges or immunities" of national citizenship do not include the
right to use contraceptives-you cannot advance the argument that
those rights are not therejust because they are not enumerated in the
Bill of Rights. 12 5
The Ninth Amendment does not address merely the enumera-
tion of rights in the Bill of Rights. It addresses "[t] he enumeration in
the Constitution of certain rights."126 The history of the provision estab-
lishes that "enumeration" means separate identification, not just seria-
123 1 CONG. REG. 434 (1789) (statement of James Madison) (emphasis added); 1
ANNALS OF CONG. 439 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789) (statement of James Madison) (em-
phasis added).
124 LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C. DoR, ON READING THE CONSTITUTION 54
(1991).
125 Id. (emphasis added).
126 U.S. CONST. amend. IX (emphasis added).
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tim listing.127 Tribe and Dorf surely do not mean to treat the Ninth
Amendment as making the obvious point that individual rights may be
protected in parts of the Constitution other than the Bill of Rights.
The Ninth Amendment's concern is with the effects of identifying
rights anywhere in the Constitution upon other rights, that is, upon
rights that are identified nowhere in the Constitution. 128 Tribe and
Dorf do not think that grandparents' rights and reproductive rights
are identified nowhere in the Constitution. They propose textual
homes for both: the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment for grandma and the Privileges or Immunities Clause of that
amendment for contraception. If the correct reading of the Four-
teenth Amendment is that it protects grandparents' rights and repro-
ductive rights, then those rights are identified in the Constitution, as
surely as a right to dance naked is identified if the First Amendment
covers it.
1 29
Do Tribe and Dorf mean to say, along with Justice Goldberg, 13 0
that the Ninth Amendment urges a broad reading of enumerated
rights? Nothing in the language or history of the amendment sup-
ports such a claim. In a later passage, they effectively withdraw their
"rule of interpretation" characterization:
We would argue that to make sense of the Ninth Amendment's pro-
scriptive role requires readers of the Constitution to assume that it
also plays a prescriptive role. What the Ninth Amendment counsels
against is the portrayal of the enumerated rights as isolated islands
127 Madison's proposed text provided: "The exceptions here or elsewhere in the con-
stitution, made in favor of particular rights, shall not be so construed as to diminish
the just importance of other rights retained by the people .... ." 1 CONG. REG. 428
(1789) (emphasis added); 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 435 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789) (emphasis
added).
128 In The Bill of Rights, Akhil Amar also seems to treat the Ninth Amendment as
concerned solely with the implications of enumeration in the Bill of Rights:
Patton's reading was thus at odds with precedent as well as with the plain
words of the Ninth Amendment that the expression of some rights (such as
"the accused's" right to jury trial) must never "be construed" by sheer impli-
cation to "deny or disparage" other rights guaranteed by the preexisting
Constitution (such as the people's right to jury trial).
AMAR, supra note 11, at 105; see also id. at 111. Perhaps Professor Amar thinks that a
right enumerated in the original Constitution is both one of the Ninth's "certain
rights" and one of the "others retained by the people," but the most natural reading
of the amendment points to two mutually exclusive sets, and deposits all enumerated
rights in the first set.
129 See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 565-66 (1991) (plurality
opinion).
130 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 493 (1965) (Goldberg, Brennan,1I.,
& Warren, C.J., concurring).
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of special protection, elevated above the surrounding sea of possible
unenumerated rights "retained by the people," for to elevate the
enumerated rights in this way would surely "disparage" those that
remain submerged. If the Ninth Amendment condemns such a dis-
integrated vision, then it must condone the opposite vision elabo-
rated by Justice Harlan in his Poe v. Ulman dissent. 131
The authors seem to suggest that the rights "retained by the peo-
ple" are federal constitutional rights-in-waiting, and that courts are au-
thorized by the Ninth Amendment to identify those rights and to
accord them federal constitutional status. An authority of that kind
was Justice Harlan's vision. 132 His claim was that such a judicial man-
date flowed from a proper reading of the Due Process Clauses of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. If Harlan was right, then the
Ninth Amendment is simply irrelevant to the issue. If the enumerated
rights include whatever freedoms the Supreme Court thinks matter,
then it would be impossible for the Court to read the Ninth Amend-
ment as a source of other constitutional freedoms. Tribe and Dorf's
claim for the Ninth Amendment at least implicitly concedes that the
Court's substantive due process jurisprudence is not plausibly attribu-
table to the Due Process Clauses.
As Madison made clear, the point of listing constitutional rights
was precisely to create "isolated islands of special protection, elevated
above the surrounding sea of possible unenumerated rights 'retained
by the people."' Listing rights was what ensured that courts would
enforce those rights as federal constitutional rights. Unlisted rights were
not disparaged by not being recognized as federal constitutional
rights, unless they already were federal constitutional rights. And for
every Samuel Chase who alleged justiciable federal constitutional
rights beyond the text,1 33 there was a James Iredell who dismissed the
allegation.134 The Ninth Amendment did not speak to that debate. It
just said that whatever legal status unlisted rights enjoyed, those rights
should not be disparaged. Unlisted rights that did not already enjoy
federal constitutional status were not disparaged by not getting fed-
eral constitutional status. Unlisted rights, whatever their status, might
be disparaged if listed, newly-federal constitutional rights were ex-
panded at their expense.
131 TRIBE & DORF, supra note 124, at 110-11.
132 See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542-43 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
133 See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 387-89 (1798).
134 See id. at 398-99 (Iredell, J., concurring).
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C. Collective Rights Analyses
Other scholars contend that the Ninth Amendment was originally
intended to constitutionalize collective (or "majoritarian") rights of
the people against the new federal government. 135 Those rights ar-
guably boil down to, 3 6 and certainly include, a collective right to
change the government by resort to "first principles," as Madison
would have said.1 3
7
When the founding generation displaced the structure of govern-
ance for which the Articles of Confederation provided, they did not
observe the Articles' own amendment mechanism. This prompted an-
tifederalists to level the following charge:
The same reasons, which you now urge for destroying our present
federal government, may be urged for abolishing the system, which
you now propose to adopt; and as the method prescribed by the articles
of confederation is now totally disregarded by you, as little regard may
be shown by you to the rules prescribed for the amendment of the new
system. 138
To this charge, Madison's response had been: "The people were in
fact, the fountain of all power, and by resorting to them, all difficulties
were got over. They could alter constitutions as they pleased. It was a
principle in the Bills of rights, that first principles might be resorted
to. "1 3 9
John Yoo contends that the Ninth Amendment was intended to
declare (and thus to preserve) this right of resort to first principles.
His difficulty is that in debate over the desirability and content of a
federal bill of rights, the Founders used the language of "rights re-
tained" with respect to individual liberties, too. 1 40
Yoo argues that "[t] he Framers explicitly included all of the rights
they considered inalienable-such as speech, press, and religion-in
135 See AMAR, supra note 11, at 120-22; Yoo, supra note 116, at 968.
136 Yoo describes rights to "speech, assembly, and petition" as "majoritarian." Yoo,
supra note 116, at 993. That description seems apt to the extent that such rights were
deployed by citizens to affect the character of their government through majoritarian
electoral processes. But does affecting the character of government exhaust the pur-
poses of constitutionally protected freedoms of speech and assembly?
137 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 476 (Max Farrand ed.,
3d ed. 1966) [hereinafter FARRAND] (recording Madison's notes of the Convention
proceedings, Aug. 31, 1787).
138 Luther Martin, Genuine Information, in 3 id. at 189 (speech delivered to the
Maryland legislature, Nov. 29, 1787).
139 2 FARRAND, supra note 137, at 476 (recording Madison's notes of the Conven-
tion proceedings, Aug. 31, 1787).
140 SeeYoo, supra note 116, at 982-85.
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the first eight amendments."'1 41 This seems to attribute an unlikely
level of certitude and consensus to the founding generation. 142
Madison had gleaned his final list from over 200 separate proposals
made in the state ratifying conventions.... Explaining his selection
to Governor Edmund Randolph, Madison said he had tried to limit
his amendments "to points which are important in the eyes of many
and can be objectionable in those of none."1 43
There remained, however, a need to ensure that constitutionalizing
those rights did not, in the words of Madison's draft, "diminish the
just importance of other rights retained by the people."144
Could constitutionalizing a collection of mostly individual rights
imply that the people had surrendered their right to revert to first
principles in changing the shape of their government? The inference
seems improbable. Had it been feared by the founding generation,
would not counterparts to the Ninth Amendment have existed in state
bills of rights? Yet there were none. State counterparts of the Ninth
Amendment's rule of construction began to sprout only subsequently
and, as Yoo recounts, the concern of these was clearly individual
rights. 145
The Founders knew how to say much more explicitly, when they
wished, that all power belongs to, and can be repossessed by, the peo-
ple. Yoo recounts provisions of pre-1789 state constitutions in which
they did so. 14 6 Madison had begun his series of amendment proposals
to the First Congress with just such a declaration.
First. That there be prefixed to the Constitution a declaration, that
all power is originally vested in, and consequently derived from, the
people.
That the people have an indubitable, unalienable, and indefea-
sible right to reform or change their Government, whenever it be
found adverse or inadequate to the purposes of its institution. 14 7
141 Id. at 984.
142 See, e.g., Philip A. Hamburger, Trivial Rights, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1, 30-35
(1994).
143 Robert A. Rutland, Framing and Ratifying the First Ten Amendments, in THE FRAM-
ING AND RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 305, 311 (Leonard W. Levy & DennisJ.
Mahoney eds., 1987) (quoting 12 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 219 (William T.
Hutchinson et al. eds., 1991)).
144 1 CONG. REG. 428 (1789); 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 435 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789).
145 Yoo, supra note 116, at 1009-22.
146 Id. at 973-76.
147 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 433-34 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789).
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Having just proposed an explicit declaration of collective rights to self-
government as part of the same package, Madison could hardly have
thought that his proposed enumeration of individual rights created
an inference adverse to those collective rights.
Yoo convincingly argues that the Ninth Amendment does not
speak only to how federal powers ought to be construed.148 As we
have seen, the amendment speaks also to how listed constitutional
rights ought to be construed. They ought to be construed with due
regard for other rights "retained by the people."
CONCLUSION
References in Founding era debate to important human rights
are replete with vaguely metaphysical adjectives-"inherent," "inalien-
able," "natural." But foremost among the human rights celebrated by
the American communities of that era was their collective right of self-
government. That was the right most palpably vindicated through the
Revolution. Madison's first proposed amendment would have reiter-
ated that "indubitable, unalienable, and indefeasible right."'149
Whatever epistemology underlay various Founders' conceptions
of individual rights, they recognized that translation into law de-
pended ultimately on the mechanisms of collective self-govern-
ment.' 50 Rights could be translated into common law by courts, but
the people had the last word on whether they were retained. Hence
the felt need for bills of rights. Eighteenth and nineteenth century
American courts did sporadically claim for themselves a power of ulti-
mate judgment about which human freedoms should receive legal
protection and how. 15 But there is no reason to think that the found-
ing generation favored lifetime appointments that carried such
power, any more than they favored royal appointments that did so. 1 5 2
148 Yoo, supra note 116 passim.
149 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 434 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789).
150 See generally Hamburger, supra note 35; Helen K. Michael, The Role of Natural
Law in Early American Constitutionalism: Did the Founders Contemplate Judicial Enforcement
of "Unwritten" Individual Rights, 69 N.C. L. REV. 421 (1991).
151 See, e.g., Loan Ass'n v. Topeka, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 655, 662-64 (1875). Contra
Loan Ass'n, 87 U.S. at 669-70 (Clifford, J., dissenting). See also Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3
Dall.) 386, 387-89 (1798). Contra Calder, 3 U.S. at 398-99 (Iredeil, J., concurring).
See also Calvin R. Massey, The Natural Law Component of the Ninth Amendment, 61 U. CIN.
L. REv. 49, 63-80 (1992); Sherry, Natural Law, supra note 81, at 182-222; Sherry,
supra note 35, at 1134-46; Sherry, The Ninth Amendment, supra note 81, at 1003-07.
152 Alexander Hamilton's advocacy of lifetime appointments for policymakers, see
1 FARRAND, supra note 137, at 288-89, received short shrift at the Philadelphia Con-
vention. "'The gentleman from New York is praised by all, but supported by no gen-
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Even if they did, those who heard or read Madison could not have
thought they were conferring that power when they adopted the
Ninth Amendment.
The Ninth Amendment operates as a working instruction to
courts. But it is not an instruction to exercise a bald power of consti-
tutional freedom-choosing for which legal training affords no special
expertise. Rather, it is an instruction to exercise a core function of
the judicial role in a new context. The function is adjudicating be-
tween competing human interests that each claim the support of ex-
isting law. The context is tension between constitutional and
nonconstitutional legal rights. The function is one that courts inevita-
bly exercise in reconciling constitutional rights-compare, for exam-
ple, the Supreme Court's construction of the First Amendment's
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses. The Ninth Amendment just
recognizes that reconciling rights has a larger role to play in constitu-
tional adjudication. Constitutional meaning is a creature of the bal-
ance courts find between the rights retained by the people in their
Constitution, and the rights retained by the people elsewhere.
tleman,' observed Dr. William Samuel Johnson." CHARLES WARREN, THE MAKING OF
THE CONSTITUTION 228 (1928) (quoting from King's notes).
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